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Tone Disclosure and Financial Performance: 
Evidence from Egypt 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The goal of our paper is to examine the impact of financial performance (FP) on tone disclosure 
(TD). We also examine the  impact  of TD on FP. Although the association  between disclosure  
and firm performance has received major interests in accounting research, the findings are always 
mixed (e.g. Baek et al. 2004). In addition, none of prior research has examined the bidirectional 
relationship between TD and FP in developing countries, particularly in   Egypt. 
 
We are motivated to focus on the Egyptian context for several reasons. One reason is the rapid 
growth of Egypt as an emerging economy with noteworthy foreign investment potential (Elsayed 
and Hoque, 2010). Egypt has a diverse financial reporting environment that might affect initial 
disclosure requirements differently. According to Gray’s (1988) model, accounting measures and 
disclosures in Egypt will tend to be more conservative and less transparent. There is a need for 
Egypt to raise capital and promote confidence as well as take stakeholders into  consideration  .  
The Egyptian environment has been dynamic, growing through different economic and political 
systems that arguably affected accounting disclosure practices. Egypt is one of the countries that 
was affected by the Arab Spring based on the 25 January revolution. Hence, Egypt provides an 
opportunity for empirical  research to gain insights into the impacts of political crisis regarding    
the extent of disclosure. Moreover, Egypt is used as an example of a major developing economy   
in the Middle East and North Africa regions, which is generally overlooked in prior research 
(Ebrahim and Abdel Fattah,  2015). 
 
Whereas prior research has extensively analysed the impact of TD on FP and stock price (e.g. 
Hutton et al., 2003), this paper provides evidence of the same association and the reverse 
relationship: FP affects TD. Using a sample of 105 Egyptian listed firms during the period 2011– 
2013, we found evidence that good news disclosure is positively associated with firms’ FP, 
suggesting that Egyptian firms that report more positive news achieve a higher FP. Our result 
supports the argument TD contains value relevant   information. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature and 
develops the research hypotheses; Section 3 presents the research design; Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6  concludes. 
 
2. Disclosure Theories, Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
 
The impact of FP on TD 
 
Agency theory proposes that managers of profitable firms disclose more information to magnify 
their success and to increase investors’ confidence in the management of firms. Managers might 
wish to encourage positive impressions using management impression techniques to attract many 
parties, such as potential lenders and investors. It also suggests that managers of profitable firms 
disclose more information to boost their compensation (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). However, 
management might disclose less information because of loss or lower profitability, as managers 
want to be vague about such poor FP results (Wang et al., 2008). Moreover, signalling theory 
recommends that profitable firms have an incentive to disclose more information, to signal the 
firm’s FP to investors to support continuation of management’s positions (Oyeler et al. 2003). 
Clatworthy and Jones (2006) argued that extreme changes in FP can affect the thematic content 
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of the narrative disclosure, such as the chairman’s statement. Clatworthy and Jones (2001) found 
that profitable firms are more inclined to discuss their results and acquisitions and disposals,     
while unprofitable firms include more discussion of board changes. Clarke (1997: p. 36) found   
that “firms with negative results do divert attention away from themselves by referring to the 
environment, target markets and emotive words rather than firms’ actions and performance 
indicators”. Clatworthy and Jones (2003) found that good FP presents more good news than bad 
news, as measured by overall words and keywords, and  bad FP  does not dwell  on  bad news. 
Prior research identifies that the writing style adopted by firms in the chairman’s statement is 
contingent on FP. For instance, Sydserff and Weetman (2002) found that the narratives of firms 
experiencing poor FP are written in a style which detaches the reader from the   message. 
 
Profitability is central to the discussion of corporate disclosure. More profitable firms will be able   
to support the cost of information production and dissemination and, therefore, will be  in  a 
position to disclose more information. Inchausti (1997) revealed that profitability is capable of 
influencing the extent to which firms disclose information in their annual reports. Ismail and 
Chandler (2005) found a positive association between disclosure and FP. It should be noted that 
empirical results do not always confirm a positive  relationship  (Garcı´a-Ayuso  and  Larrinaga, 
2003). In the context of the agency and political  cost theories,  Ng and Koh (1994)  pointed out  
the fact that profitable firms are more exposed to political pressure and public scrutiny, and use 
more self-regulating mechanisms to avoid regulation. Singhvi  and  Desai  (1971)  claimed  that, 
when a firm’s FP is high, managers are  motivated  to disclose  detailed  information  to support 
their positions. This positive correlation between a firm’s FP and corporate disclosure is also  
implied by the theoretical model of voluntary disclosure in the face of adverse selection. The       
firm is likely to disclose more frequently when it is experiencing favourable earnings results and 
earnings forecasts are associated with positive returns. Chiu and Wang (2015) examined 
determinants of corporate reporting by using a sample of 246 listed firms in Taiwan. They 
demonstrated that measures of stakeholder power, strategic posture, economic resources, firm     
size and media visibility are related to corporate disclosure. Cho et al. (2010) found that firms      
that are more profitable tend to use more positive language in their disclosures  or  decisive 
language. The literature’s research results on profitability as a determinant of disclosure appear 
inconclusive (Street and Gray, 2002). Aras et al. (2010) did not find any association between FP    
and disclosure. Oeyono et al. (2011) found a positive association between both variables. Further,    
a few studies have asserted that there is a negative association between disclosures  and  FP 
(Rahman et al., 2011). Management appears to elaborate on positive FP in the narrative sections, 
such as the chairman’s statement, but prefers to communicate poor FP more concisely. 
Nevertheless, this paper argues that good FP is a good incentive for more disclosure, particularly 
good news, as profitable firms have better stories to tell and are more able to afford the cost of 
disclosure. We proxy FP with ROA and anticipate a statistically positive relationship between the 
proxy and TD. Therefore, we hypothesise  that 
 
H1. There is a relationship between TD and  FP. 
 
The impact of TD on FP 
 
Empirical results on disclosure are commonly consistent with  finance-theory  predictions  that 
more public information improves a firm’s value by decreasing the firm’s cost of capital (Hassan    
et al., 2009). Lambert et al. (2007) argued that increased disclosure may affect a firm’s value by 
increasing the actual cash flows stockholders accrue as a result of lessening agency problems. 
Theoretical models of disclosure assume that managers maximise their firm’s stock price and 
conclude that when a higher price can be obtained by withholding  the  news,  managers  will 
abstain from disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983). Ayers et al. (2011) showed that, following good news, 
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shares outperform immediately after the announcement. Skinner (1994) found that bad news 
disclosures generate larger stock price reactions than good news. Athanasakou and Hussainey  
(2014) showed that narrative reduces market uncertainty about future earnings and increases the 
credibility of financial statements. Managers pursuing stockholder wealth maximisation will only 
disclose news likely to increase share prices. Lev and Penman (1990) provided evidence that US 
firms are more likely to disclose good news than bad with respect to earnings disclosures. They 
supported the ‘good news hypothesis’, that good news firms make more disclosures than bad    
news firms to achieve benefits, such as a reduction in information asymmetry and a lower cost of 
capital. Dedman and Lin (2002) found that only half of their sample of CEO departures were 
announced to the regulatory news service, even though this was proved by the share  price 
reactions to the release of this information by the financial press. Miller (2002) documented a 
positive association  between  share price/earnings performance  and  disclosure. Good/bad  news 
is also associated with abnormal returns at the time of an earnings announcement (Francis et al., 
2002). These researchers stated that firms with higher disclosure scores exhibit higher levels 
regarding the share-price anticipation of future earnings than firms with lower disclosure scores. 
Schleicher and Walker (2010) found that loss-making firms provide a more positive tone, while 
firms with an earnings decline provide a more negative tone. Hassan et al. (2009) stated that 
disclosure is a mechanism to mitigate agency costs arising from the possibility that managers may 
not  act  in the best  interest of shareholders. The investors’ business  comprehension increases  
with disclosure and thus enhances the firms’ value. Mechanisms of disclosure allowing investors    
to upsurge their ability in firm monitoring then increase FP. Clarkson et al. (2008) documented a 
positive association between disclosure and firm’s value. Consistent with signalling theory, 
management, when in possession of ‘good news’ due to better FP, is more likely to disclose      
more detailed information to the stock market than that provided by ‘bad news’ firms, to avoid   
the undervaluation of their shares. Empirical research offer mixed outcomes.  For  instance,  
Francis et al. (1994) found no evidence of announcement-day market returns being associated    
with the tone of press coverage in the year prior to the adverse announcement. In contrast,     
Davis et al. (2012) found that narrative disclosure is associated with abnormal returns. Smith and 
Taffler (2000) showed that narrative disclosures based on the content  of  the  chairman’s  
statement are associated with FP. Thus, we expect a positive effect of TD on   FP. 
 
H2. The relationship between TD and FP is  bidirectional. 
 
3. Research Design 
 
Sample selection 
 
Our sample is a balanced panel data of 105 firms listed on the Egyptian stock market during the 
three-year period 2011–2013. Our final data set comprises 315 firm-year observations. Given the 
existence of both cross-sectional and time-series information, we were able to use panel-data 
analysis. The explanatory and control variables data are collected from OSIRIS and Datastream. 
The Egyptian Stock Exchange website also provided relevant data,  such  as:  industry  
classifications and fundamental information for all listed firms. Annual reports were purchased  
from the Egyptian stock market. The annual reports were in Arabic, so counting the sentences of 
good news and bad news was carried out manually.  For consistency  and  reliability,  a sample of 
the annual reports was given to an Egyptian colleague to read and  count the sentences of good   
and bad news, to ensure the results we obtained were   accurate. 
Research variables and model 
Dependent variable (TD) 
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We count the number of good news statements and bad news statements, and then we calculate  
net news based on the variances between good and bad news information. To test the validity of 
our disclosure measure, we gave a sample of the annual reports to an Egyptian professional to    
read and    count the sentences of good and bad news, to make sure that our score is valid. 
 
Measurement of independent and control  variables 
 
We use Return on Assets (ROA) as a measure for firm performance. We consider seven control 
variables: firm size (Hackston and Milne, 1996);  audit  quality  (Francis,  2004);  industry  sector 
(Dye and Sridhar, 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005); leverage (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); firm     
age (Muttakin and Khan, 2014); liquidity (Wallace and Naser, 1995); firm growth (Khurana et al., 
2006). 
 
Empirical model 
 
For first stage of this study, which focused on the impacts of ROA on TD; we specify three 
models: in the first model we use good news as a dependent, in the second model we use bad   
news as a dependent and in the third model we use net news. Following preceding narrative 
disclosure studies (e.g. Ressas and Hussainey, 2014), we use the  following  OLS  regression  
models: 
 
GNDit = βͲ + Uͳ ROAit + βʹ LIQit + β͵ LEVit  + βͶ F. GROWit  + βͷ SIZEit  + β͸ SECTit  + β͹ AGE+ βͺ AUDITit + ɛit (1) 
 
BNDit  = βͲ + Uͳ ROAit  +  βʹ LIQit  + β͵ LEVit  + βͶ F. GROWit  + βͷ SIZEit  + β͸ SECTit  + β͹ AGE+ βͺ AUDITit + ɛit (2) 
 
NNDit = /30 + p1 ROAit + /32 LIQit + /33 LEVit  + /34 F. GROWit + /35 SIZEit  + 
/36 SECTORit + /37 AGE+ /38 AUDITit + ɛit (3) 
Where GND = good news disclosure; BND = bad news disclosure; NND = net news disclosure; ROA: 
return on assets; AUDIT: dummy code 1 if the firm is audited by one of the four big auditor offices or 0 
otherwise; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: 
leverage (total debts to total assets); F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); AGE: age of the firm; SECT: 
category of each sector. 
 
For the second stage of this study, which focused on the value relevance of tone disclosure on a 
firm’s performance, measured by ROA, we specify three additional models, as   follows: 
 
ROAit  = /30 + p1 GNDit +  /32 SIZEit +  /33 LIQit + /34 LEVit  + /35 F. GROWit 
+ /36 SECTORit + /37 AGE+ βͺ AUDITit + ɛit (4) 
ROAit  = /30 + p1 BNDit +  /32 SIZEit +  /33 LIQit + /34 LEVit  + /35 F. GROWit 
+ /36 SECTORit + /37 AGE+ /38 AUDITit + ɛit (5) 
ROAit = βͲ + pͳ NNDit + /32 SIZEit + /33 LIQit + βͶ LEVit + βͷ F. GROWit + β͸ SECTORit  + β͹ AGE+ βͺ AUDITit + ɛit (6) 
 
Where GND = good news disclosure; BND = bad news disclosure; NND = net news disclosure; ROA: 
return on assets; AUDIT: dummy code 1 if the firm is audited by one of the four big auditor offices or 0 
otherwise; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: 
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leverage (total debts to total assets); F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); AGE: age of the firm; SECT: 
category of each sector. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 shows that the average narrative disclosure for good news, bad news and net news is 3.6; 
1.6 and 1.9, respectively. The profitability ratio varies between firms, with a minimum level of - 
0.77 and a maximum level of 0.37. The average ROA  for our selected  firms is 0.05. Thirty-two  
per cent of the listed Egyptian firms are audited by one of the big four audit firms. The average   
age of our selected firms is 34.6 years. The mean liquidity during the three years is 5.39, while the 
average  leverage  is 40%. On  average,  the  firm  size (SIZE) is 8.273  million, with  a minimum of 
4.65 million and a maximum of 10.34 million. Our sample is drawn from a diverse range of 
industries, including telecommunications, manufacture and exports/imports. The average growth 
rate is -53.75, with a maximum value of  1. 
 
Table 2 shows net news disclosure is positively correlated with ROA and size. However, the net 
news disclosure score is negatively correlated with leverage. Observations in  the  correlation  
matrix show that all of the correlation coefficients are below 80%. This indicates that there is no 
evidence of multicollinearity problems (Hair et al., 2010). Tables 3 and 4 show that VIF does not 
exceed more than two. Therefore, there is no multicollinearity problem between independent 
variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive analysis 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
G.N 
B.N 
NET.N 
ROA 
AUDIT 
313 
313 
315 
390 
314 
0.00 
0.00 
-15.00 
-0.77 
0.00 
22.00 
24.00 
20.00 
0.37 
1.00 
3.600 
1.648 
1.939 
0.053 
0.324 
4.75256 
2.91731 
4.79844 
0.10679 
0.46906 
1.677 
3.210 
0.739 
-2.099 
0.752 
2.346 
15.064 
2.413 
17.587 
-1.444 
SIZE 390 4.65 10.34 8.273 1.21619 -1.072 0.818 
LIQ 390 0.11 304.53 5.39 20.842 9.819 12.514 
LEV 390 0.00 1.95 0.40 0.258 1.345 5.422 
F.GROW 
SECT 
383 
379 
-424.58 
1.00 
1.00 
16.00 
-53.75 
5.910 
367.80 
4.283 
-9.275 
1.123 
94.813 
-0.032 
AGE 322 1.00 123.00 34.66 20.92 1.667 4.017 
Variable definition: G.N: Good news; B.N: Bad news; NET.N: (Net news) The difference between good and bad news; 
ROA: return on assets; AUDIT: dummy code 1 if the firm audited by one of the four big  auditor office or 0 otherwise;  
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: Leverage (total debts to 
total assets); F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); AGE: age of the firm; SECT: category of each sector (e.g., construction; 
chemicals and telecommunication) 
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Table 2: Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the continuous independent variables 
NET.N ROA AUDIT SIZE LIQ LEV F.GROW SECT AGE 
NET.N 
ROA 
AUDIT 
1 0.354** 0.055 0.127* -0.027 -0.206** -0.087 -0.024 -0.096 
0.311** 
0.109 
1 0.024 .245** -0.020 -.483** -0.013 -0.029 -.120* 
0.057 1 .389** -.118* .141* -0.003 -.238** .154* 
SIZE 0.140* 0.142** 0.416** 1 -0.070 -.151** -.125* 0.005 -0.101 
LIQ 0.208** 0.341** -.194** -.177** 1 -.287** -0.003 .105* -.183** 
LEV -0.162** -.285** 0.194** 0.072 -.730** 1 0.020 -.177** .180** 
F.GROW -0.006 0.015 -0.037 -.332** 0.090 -0.085 1 -0.020 -0.062 
SECT -0.034 -0.100 -.319** -.125* .107* -.127* -0.040 1 -0.044 
AGE -0.149* 0.027 0.148* -.114* -.131* 0.086 0.067 -0.092 1 
Variable definition: NET.N: (net news) The difference between good and bad news; ROA: return on assets; Auditor: dummy 
code 1 if the firm audited by one of the four big auditor office or 0 otherwise; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LIQ: 
liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: Leverage (total debts to total  assets); F.GROW:  firm growth (assets  
growth); AGE: age of the firm; SECT: category of each sector (e.g., construction; chemicals  and telecommunication);  (*) 
Statistical significance at 10% level; (**) Statistical significance at 5% level; (***) Statistical significance at 1%  level 
 
Table 3 shows the impact of FP on TD. For model 1, where the good news serves as the  
dependent variable, the coefficient of good news is positive and also statistically significant, with  
the ROA at 5%. For model 2, where the bad news serves as the dependent  variable,  the  
coefficient is negative and also statistically significant, with the ROA at 10%. For model 3, where 
the net news serves as the dependent variable, the coefficient is positive  and  statistically  
significant, with the ROA at 1%. Therefore, as predicted in hypothesis H1, a firm’s likelihood of 
disclosing its good news is positively associated with its FP, as reported in model 1. Thus, 
hypothesis H1 is accepted. The positive effect of FP on disclosure is consistent with signalling 
theory, which proposes that managers of profitable firms are more likely to disclose more 
information in their annual reports to justify their remunerations and to signal their superior 
performance to the market (Wallace et al. 1994). This means that profitable firms provide more 
positive good news than loss-making firms. In other words, profitable firms disclose good news 
information in their narratives to send a positive signal to all stakeholders. Our findings are also 
consistent with Clatworthy and Jones (2003) and Schleicher and Walker   (2010). 
 
With regard to the control variables, our results support the suggestions  that  leverage  is  
negatively significant with disclosure, as reported in models 1 and 3. We also find a negative 
association between liquidity as well as firm growth and good news, at the 10% level. Regarding   
the role of the external auditor, we find a negative association between auditors and bad news, at 
the 10% level. For other variables, we could not find any significant association between size,  
sector and firm age towards narrative disclosure in the three   models. 
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Table 3: Impact of financial performance on disclosure quality 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the impact of TD on FP. For model 4, where we measure the impacts of good   
news on the FP, the result is both positive and significant, at the 10% level. This means that, 
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when a firm discloses good news about its activities, ROA is growing. The reverse association 
approved in  model 5 identifies that the disclosure of bad  news has a negative impact on  the  
firm’s performance, or ROA, at the 10% level. For model 6, we find that net news has a positive 
impact on ROA, at the 1% level. Thus, we conclude that tone disclosure has an impact on FP.  
Also, models 4, 5 and 6 investigate hypothesis H2, that is, whether the narrative good and bad  
news disclosure of a firm has a favourable influence on the FP. Hypothesis H2 is accepted, as 
shown in our three models. This result conforms to the traditional view that more information  
adds value to firms. Our results are consistent with signalling theory and relevant literature (i..e. 
Drobetz et al.,  2004), who determined that firms with better disclosure practices are associated  
with a higher FP. The effect is not only statistically significant, but its magnitude is also  
considerable from an economic point of  view. 
 
The positive effect of TD on FP shows that disclosing more good information leads to a higher  
FP. This indicates that increasing good news information reduce information asymmetry and  
results in a reduction in both monitoring and capital costs (Cheung et al., 2010). Moreover, an 
higher level of disclosure improves management accountability and hence the  firm  value.  
Investors are more likely to evaluate the performance of these firms more highly, and  this  
increases investment interest and a firm’s performance. On the other hand, the analytical 
accounting models challenge the traditional sight of  disclosure  effects.  Wagenhofer  (2004)  
argued that the effects of disclosure depend on uncertainty, multi-person settings with conflicts     
of interest and information asymmetry. Thus, it is possible to expect a negative  relationship 
between increased TD and FP. For instance, more public disclosure might reduce the acquisition  
of information by market participants, and thus decrease the total amount  of  information  
available in the capital market.  More public information might also have negative net benefits if  
the information places a firm at a competitive disadvantage relative to its rivals. These results 
emphasise that the association between FP and disclosure is complex and depends on the 
interaction of a number of factors, such as category of disclosure and the context in which this 
association is examined. 
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Table 4: Impact of disclosure quality on financial performance 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
  Good news Bad news Net news VIF 
 Coef. t. Stat Coef. t. Stat Coef. t. Stat  
Constant  0.809  1.484  0.979  
G.N 0.134 3.141**     1.040 
B.N   -0.083 -1.915*   1.039 
NET.N     0.185 4.346*** 1.057 
LIQ -0.134 -2.994 -0.155 -3.462 -0.136 -3.081 1.132 
LEV -0.494 -10.696 -0.511 -11.096 -0.479 -10.449 1.209 
F.GROW 0.024 0.575 0.013 0.292 0.025 0.592 1.029 
SIZE 0.160 3.420 0.154 3.250 0.151 3.263 1.246 
SECT -0.105 -2.411 -0.097 -2.208 -0.096 -2.231 1.073 
AGE -0.016 -0.374 -0.020 -0.458 -0.010 -0.236 1.061 
AUDIT -0.007 -0.147 -0.017 -0.347 -0.018 -0.386 1.254 
YEAR dummy Included Included Included  
Model Summary      
R Square 0.313  0.302 0.328  
F value 22.234  21.133 23.836  
P value 0.000  0.000 0.000  
Variable definition: G.N: Good news; B.N: Bad news; NET.N: (net news), The difference between good and bad 
news; AUDIT: dummy code 1 if the firm audited by one of the four big auditor office or 0 otherwise; SIZE: natural 
logarithm of total assets; LIQ: liquidity (current assets to current liabilities); LEV: Leverage  (total debts to total  
assets); F.GROW: firm growth (assets growth); ROA: return on assets; AGE: age of the company; SECT: category 
of each sector (e.g., construction; chemicals and telecommunication); (*) Statistical significance at 10% level; (**) 
Statistical significance at 5% level; (***) Statistical significance at 1%  level 
 
To conclude,  our findings support our hypotheses that there is an association between FP and  
TD. Consequently, this suggests that the narrative disclosure is determined by their FP. This 
proposes that the causality between the two endogenous variables runs from FP to TD and from 
TD to FP. Our findings are consistent with recent research by Farag et al. (2014), who provided 
evidence about the positive direction between disclosure and FP. Our findings show that high- 
profitable firms report more good news and less bad news in the narrative sections of annual 
reports. The study found that variances between good and bad news were positive during  the  
three years, which reflects that Egyptian firms between 2011 and 2013 disclose good news more 
than bad news. However, Beekes et al. (2015) argued that firms generally have increased their 
disclosure frequency and demonstrated an improvement in the timeliness of bad news relative to 
good news, indicating a levelling of disclosure practices and greater transparency. Our result may   
be explained by the political situation after the 25 January revolution, which enhanced the market 
situation and  attracted investors. This justification  supports the argument about  the effect of  
crisis on financial reporting. Our findings are consistent with  Keusch  et  al.  (2012:623),  who 
found that “a crisis situation leads to more extensive use of self-serving bias as adverse external 
economic conditions are used by managers to present themselves in the best possible light”. 
However, our findings are inconsistent with Ressas and Hussainey  (2014),  who  provided  
evidence that, in a crisis period,  firms report more bad news and less good news information.    
This might indicate that managers offer credible information at a time of crisis. Clatworthy and 
Jones  (2003)  showed  that  firms  prefer  to  use  bad  news  disclosure  to  blame  the       external 
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environment rather than an economic or political crisis. Moreover, the evidence  about  the  
positive variances of good/bad news by Egyptian firms is consistent with the idea that managers 
face an asymmetric loss function in choosing their voluntary  disclosure  policies.  Managers  
behave as if they bear large costs when investors are surprised by large  negative  earnings news,  
but not when other earnings news is  announced. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We offer evidence on the the bidirectional association between TD and FP We add to the scarce 
evidence on TD in developing countries. We extend prior research, which mainly focus on one 
direction, to measuring the bidirection between FP and   discloaure. 
 
We provide evidence that Egyptian firms tend to benefit from greater good  news disclosure.    
Our results may help regulators to adopt an appropriate balance of legislation, regulatory reform 
and enforcement to make improvements in the good and bad disclosure practices as well as the 
enhancement of organisational legitimacy. While previous research showed that analysts and 
investors rely on annual report narratives for decision making, these statements remain largely 
unregulated and unaudited. The study will be of value to academic researchers in the field of 
impression management and to users of annual reports who may rely on narrative sections, such   
as the chairman’s statement, for decision making. 
 
We focus only on annual reports. Future research may consider other financial communication 
channels. We focus only on Egyptian firms. However, we believe that the same hypotheses are 
worth testing outside Egypt, and that it is reasonable to expect a higher  level  of  tone  
management disclosure in other countries with better investor protection and with  more  
developed capital markets. While this study used ROA as  an  accounting  measure  for 
performance, further research may use Tobin’s Q or other market-based  measure  of  
performance. Future research may also examine the impact of the  Arab  Spring  on  the  
association between TD and FP.  Finally, it might be interesting  to test the association between  
TD and FP before and after political crises such as the Arab   Spring. 
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